$245 billion more

That's what the administration wants for Iraq and Afghanistan in the next two years: $100 billion for the rest of 2007 (on top of $70 billion already approved) and $145 billion in 2008. Plans call for an appropriation of $50 billion in 2009, and none after that when the hope is we will have withdrawn.

Add that $295 billion to the $378 billion already appropriated for Iraq and at least $70 billion for Afghanistan, and it brings the total cost of the two wars to nearly $800 billion -- more expensive than Vietnam even on an inflation-adjusted basis. Never mind the indirect costs, or the long-term costs for things like health care for veterans, which added in would bring the total cost into the $2 trillion to $3 trillion range.

The Afghan expenditures I have no quarrel with. The Iraq expenses, which account for the bulk of the money, represent an incredible amount of forgone opportunities in order to pursue an unnecessary war.

Speaking of which, the latest NIE makes clear that prospects for success are daunting.

Iraqi leaders will be hard pressed to achieve sustained political reconciliation in the next year to year and a half, a collaborative report by 16 U.S. spy agencies says, raising uncertainty about the prospect for withdrawing American troops that are shoring up the government.

Months in the making, the assessment says that growing and entrenched polarization between Shia and Sunni Muslims, inadequate Iraqi security forces, weak leaders, and the success of extremists' efforts to use violence to exacerbate the sectarian war all create a situation that will be difficult to improve.

One key point it makes is that Iraqi security forces are unlikely to be ready to take over responsibility for security in the next 12 to 18 months -- raising the question of what happens to the benchmarks we've told Iraq to meet, and how long we're willing to hold their hand.

And while it accuses Iran of meddling, it also says Iraq's neighbors are not "major drivers" of violence, nor are they likely to be -- largely because Iraqis are more than capable of generating plenty of violence on their own.

There is one hopeful section:

The estimate said some positive developments could — analysts stressed "could" — help reverse negative trends. They include broader acceptance of the Sunni minority of the central government and concessions on the part of Shiites and Kurds to make more room for Sunni participation.

This would be more hopeful if the first part of the report didn't assess the likelihood of any of that happening as very small.

NIE, Iraq, politics, midtopia