Midtopia

Midtopia

Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts
Showing posts with label intelligence. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

We had to destroy the village in order to save it

That seems to be the logic behind spy chief Mike McConnell's breezy description of his plan to monitor every bit of communication on the Internet. This according to a wide-ranging interview (not yet online) in New Yorker magazine.

The nation's top spy, Michael McConnell, thinks the threat of cyberarmageddon! is so great that the U.S. government should have unfettered and warrantless access to U.S. citizens' Google search histories, private e-mails and file transfers, in order to spot the cyberterrorists in our midst.

It's hard to believe he would actually suggest such a thing. But it's not just an outraged Wired blogger saying it. So is the Wall Street Journal. And myriad other outlets.

Unless McConnell's own description of his plan is completely off the mark, I can't think of a meaningful debate to have over it. Even if he's right -- that massive eavesdropping is the only way to catch cyberterrorists or terrorists using the Internet to organize attacks -- the proposed solution is so violative of common notions of privacy that it is simply beyond consideration.

And what happens when the terrorists switch to snail mail -- will the government suddenly find it necessary to open and read everybody's letters?

McConnell's NSA background really comes through on issues like this. The NSA, after all, is a giant data vacuum, sucking up information a thousand different ways from a thousand classified sources. That's the hammer he's used to, and it's natural that every problem he encounters looks like a nail.

But the NSA listens in on overseas conversations, not domestic ones. What McConnell has essentially proposed is turning that capacity inward, on to our own citizens, in a surveillance society that would put the secret police of even the most tightly controlled dictatorship to shame.

Sure, there would be legal protections: no getting thrown in a dark hole simply for saying something unkind about the government. At least, not yet or not often.

But it shifts the whole balance of power between citizen and government. A limited government is prevented from knowing too much about you, and thus is powerless to misuse information it does not have. A limited citizenry surrenders the information but trusts government-enforced laws to protect it from ... the government.

Fox guarding the henhouse, anyone?

Its like the apocryphal crocodile bird, which walks into the mouths of crocodiles and picks junk off their teeth. Generally, it doesn't get eaten. But it's totally at the mercy of the croc. Is that freedom?

The government has legitimate law-enforcement and national-security needs, and surveillance is part of their toolbox. But it's a limited tool for a reason. If we cannot protect ourselves from terrorists by using warrants, then we either have to come up with a different strategy or just get used to living with a higher level of risk. Freedom isn't free, to put a different twist on an overused saying.

So, to McConnell: Not just no, but hell no.

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Friday, December 14, 2007

Torture is in the eye of the beholder

President Bush declares "we don't torture." But that's only true if you accept his definition of the term -- which apparently doesn't include several techniques that most other people consider torture. Dan Froomkin writes:

The bill would require U.S. intelligence agencies to follow interrogation rules adopted by the armed forces last year....

Those rules explicitly prohibit "forcing detainees to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a sexual manner; placing hoods or sacks over detainees' heads or duct tape over their eyes; beating, shocking, or burning detainees; threatening them with military dogs; exposing them to extreme heat or cold; conducting mock executions; depriving them of food, water, or medical care; and waterboarding."

Okay, I'll side with Bush on the forcing to be naked and sexual posing. That's humiliating, and shouldn't be allowed, but it's not torture.

But the rest?

Bush relies on the sophistry of "not telling our enemies what methods we use" as his excuse for opposing such clear bills. But that makes little sense. Yes, you don't publish a manual of interrogation methods. But if you can't label a given technique torture, then you can't meaningfully apply a law that outlaws torture -- and thus any claims that "we don't torture" are meaningless and unenforceable.

Froomkin also covers the contempt of Congress citations issued to Karl Rove and Josh Bolten for refusing to turn over documents related to the U.S. attorney firings. Interestingly, Republican senators Arlen Specter and Charles Grassley voted in favor of the citations -- deflating to some extent accusation that the charges are purely politically motivated.

For its part, the White House repeated its meaningless offer to let Rove and Bolten be interviewed without oaths or transcripts. And it vowed that the Justice Department would not enforce the contempt citations, preventing the issue -- which, questions of right or wrong aside, boils down to a separation-of-powers spat -- from being heard in the courts.

As Froomkin writes:

The White House position, of course, exposes an amazing conundrum: That the same Justice Department whose politicization is being investigated is also in a position to hand out get-out-of-testifying-free cards.

This may be within the executive's power, but it's not right. Both sides should agree to have the matter reviewed by the judiciary, which can rule on whether Congress has the power of oversight in this matter. If so, the documents must be turned over; if not, they don't.

But the scorched earth stonewalling by the White House serves no legitimate purpose.

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Wednesday, September 05, 2007

Data-mining program dropped

The Department of Homeland Security has dropped one of its most ambitious data-mining projects after determining that it was cumbersome and had violated privacy rules.

Known as ADVISE and begun in 2003, the Analysis, Dissemination, Visualization, Insight and Semantic Enhancement program was developed by the department and the Lawrence Livermore and Pacific Northwest national laboratories for use by many DHS components, including immigration, customs, border protection, biological defense and its intelligence office.

The problems: They tested it for two years with real data instead of made-up data, violating privacy rules; and analysts found it "cumbersome" to use. Translation: it didn't work as intended.

Which has always been my problem with data-mining. It's great in theory, and I have no philosophical problem with it if personally identifiable information is protected. But the privacy worries are real -- this was the second data-mining project to violate privacy rules -- and connecting the dots turns out to be far more difficult than envisioned.

We should keep working on such systems to perfect them. But there should be two caveats: a sort of "proof of concept" that data-mining actually works, and strict privacy protections so that ordinary people don't find their data being bandied about by government bureaucrats.

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Tuesday, June 26, 2007

Good reads

A roundup of links worth clicking on:

1. A New York Times story on an Army platoon dealing with a Baquba neighborhood that is one big booby trap. They get through without a scratch.

2. The former chief judge of the FISA court, Royce C. Lambeth, reveals some details of the court's workings. His anecdotes are interesting, and provide yet another rebuke to the White House's contention that the court functions too slowly to combat modern terrorists.

3. The CIA continues to release once-secret documents detailing their most controversial activities from 1959 to the mid-1970s, including assassination plots and domestic surveillance. They serve as a reminder of why civil liberties and governmental openness are such crucial foundations of democracy. You can dig through the documents themselves at the CIA's Freedom of Information page.

4. The Washington Post's Dana Milbank writes a somewhat sardonic column about everything Cheney.

5. A few Democrats, going a bridge too far, aren't satisfied with leaving Iraq; they want us out of Afghanistan, too. They're wrong. Afghanistan has its problems, and the conflict is fueled by the Taliban safe haven in Pakistan. But our invasion was justified, the government legitimate, the enemy beatable, and we're not stuck in the middle of an ethnic and regional cauldron. As well, the troop demands and casualty rates are much lower, so our presence there is far more sustainable. And most importantly, Afghanistan is far more likely than Iraq to return to being a terror haven if we withdraw.


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Friday, April 27, 2007

The rush to war...

Former CIA director George Tenet vents some spleen about the handling of intelligence in the runup to the Iraq invasion.

George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, has lashed out against Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush administration officials in a new book, saying they pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a “serious debate” about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States.

The 549-page book, “At the Center of the Storm,” is to be published by HarperCollins on Monday. By turns accusatory, defensive, and modestly self-critical, it is the first detailed account by a member of the president’s inner circle of the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the decision to invade Iraq and the failure to find the unconventional weapons that were a major justification for the war.

“There was never a serious debate that I know of within the administration about the imminence of the Iraqi threat,” Mr. Tenet writes in a devastating judgment that is likely to be debated for many years. Nor, he adds, “was there ever a significant discussion” about the possibility of containing Iraq without an invasion.

Mr. Tenet admits that he made his famous “slam dunk” remark about the evidence that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. But he argues that the quote was taken out of context and that it had little impact on President Bush’s decision to go to war. He also makes clear his bitter view that the administration made him a scapegoat for the Iraq war.

I have no idea if there's anything truly revelatory in the book or not. And, of course, one can always accuse Tenet of being self-serving.

But it does show an insider saying the administration was pretty much determined to invade Iraq, no matter what.

About his "slam dunk" comment:
He gives a detailed account of the episode, which occurred during an Oval Office meeting in December 2002 when the administration was preparing to make public its case for war against Iraq.

During the meeting, the deputy C.I.A. director, John McLaughlin, unveiled a draft of a proposed public presentation that left the group unimpressed. Mr. Tenet recalls that Mr. Bush suggested that they could “add punch” by bringing in lawyers trained to argue cases before a jury.

“I told the president that strengthening the public presentation was a ‘slam dunk,’ a phrase that was later taken completely out of context,” Mr. Tenet writes. “If I had simply said, ‘I’m sure we can do better,’ I wouldn’t be writing this chapter — or maybe even this book.”

And regarding Bush's interest in terrorism:

The book recounts C.I.A. efforts to fight Al Qaeda in the years before the Sept. 11 attacks, and Mr. Tenet’s early warnings about Osama bin Laden. He contends that the urgent appeals of the C.I.A. on terrorism received a lukewarm reception at the Bush White House through most of 2001.

That said, he describes Bush himself in a generally positive light. And he also thinks Al-Qaeda has cells in the United States planning further attacks.

(See related post)

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Thursday, April 26, 2007

Rice will reject Congressional subpoena

Secretayr of State Condoleeza Rice says Congressional questions about Iraqi WMD have already been answered, so she doesn't intend to appear before Congress to discuss the matter.

Rice said she respected the oversight function of the legislative branch, but maintained she had already testified in person and under oath about claims that Iraq had sought uranium from Africa during her confirmation hearing for the job of secretary of state.

"I addressed these questions, almost the same questions, during my confirmation hearing," she said. "This is an issue that has been answered and answered and answered."

While this could still become an issue -- Congress doesn't really like having its subpoenas ignored -- Rice made a move to defuse the issue, offering to answer their questions in a letter.

That's hardly the same thing as being there in person, where answers can themselves be questioned in order to get more clarity or detail. But given her previous testimony, Rice's offer is reasonable. Let her send the letter, and then let Congress explain why the letter is insufficient and an appearance is necessary.

Meanwhile, use that subpoena power for a far more promising subject, the aluminum tubes issue.

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Friday, March 16, 2007

Plame testifies before Congress


As I mentioned a few days ago, Valerie Plame is testifying before Congress today, as Democrats try to keep the Plame scandal going as long as possible now that the Lewis Libby trial is over. It's a transparent political move, but at the same time it's the first time we've got Plame under oath, so we may get some good questions and answers that we should have gotten long ago.

For now, two links: the AP story on the hearing and a transcript of the opening remarks.

The most notable statements so far:

1. Plame categorically denied having anything to do with sending her husband to Niger, saying "I did not recommend him. I did not suggest him. There was no nepotism involved. I did not have the authority."

2. She repeatedly described herself as a "covert operative," saying she worked undercover and traveled abroad on secret CIA missions. But she says she doesn't know if she was covert in a legal sense. She also says that shouldn't have mattered -- that White House officials, realizing she worked for the CIA, should have checked before discussing her with the press.

More assertive is the statement Rep. Henry Waxman made in opening the session. The relevant quote from the transcript:

But General Hayden and the CIA have cleared these following comments for today's hearing.

During her employment at the CIA, Ms. Wilson was undercover. Her employment status with the CIA was classified information, prohibited from disclosure under Executive Order 12958.

At the time of the publication of Robert Novak's column on July 14, 2003, Ms. Wilson's CIA employment status was covert. This was classified information.

Got that? The CIA is saying (by clearing the comment with Waxman) that the fact Plame worked for the CIA was a secret, and thus White House officials revealed classified information.

Republican Tom Davis admits as much in his remarks:

Let me state at the outset that the outing of Mrs. Wilson's identity was wrong. And we have every right to look at this and investigate it.

His argument, though, is that nobody at the White House knew Plame's identity was classified because the CIA didn't make it clear that it was.

No process can be adopted to protect classified information that no one knows is classified, just as no one can be prosecuted for unauthorized disclosure of information that no one ever said was protected. So this looks to me more like a CIA problem than a White House problem. If the agency doesn't take sufficient precautions to protect the identity of those who engage in covert work, no one else can do it for them.

True enough. But that doesn't address Plame's argument: That the simple fact she worked at the CIA should have served as a red flag. A prudent administration would have checked with the agency before discussing any CIA employee with the press.

Davis is arguing what the White House knew; Plame is arguing what the White House should have known.

It's hard to disagree with either of them, given the facts we know at the moment. That's why it's highly probable no crime was committed, even while the administration is properly flagellated for being careless with Plame's identity.

More updates as events warrant.

Update: Another witness testified about the Bush administration's lac, of curiosity about the leak, despite promises to the contrary:

Dr. James Knodell, director of the Office of Security at the White House, told a congressional committee today that he was aware of no internal investigation or report into the leak of covert CIA agent Valerie Plame....

Knodell said that he had started at the White House in August 2004, a year after the leak, but his records show no evidence of a probe or report there: "I have no knowledge of any investigation in my office," he said.

Rep. Waxman recalled that President Bush had promised a full internal probe. Knodell repeated that no probe took place, as far as he knew, and was not happening today.

Knodell said he had "no" conversations whatsoever with the president, vice president, Karl Rove or anyone about the leak.

Hmm. The administration promised to investigate itself and then didn't. I'm shocked, I tell you; shocked.

Update II: The video of Plame's testimony.

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Friday, March 09, 2007

Plame to go under oath

In case you aren't heartily sick of the whole Plamegate thing, Henry Waxman has decided to hold hearings a week from today on the disclosure of Valerie Plame's identity -- and have Plame herself testify under oath.

This is an obvious Democratic attempt to keep flogging the Plame scandal now that the Libby trial is over. But it could be interesting to have Plame under oath. Republicans will have a chance to ask questions about her role in her husband's Niger trip, just how secret her identity was, and the like. If they pick their questions well, and don't simply grandstand, we might actually learn something interesting.

We'll see.

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Wednesday, March 07, 2007

Americans are sensible

I like Americans. They may not always pay attention, but when they finally do they usually get it right.

Americans increasingly suspect the federal government has become cloaked in secrecy, a concern they don't have with their local and state governments.

People also overwhelmingly believe that their federal leaders have become sneaky, listening to telephone conversations or opening private mail without getting court permission, according to a survey of 1,008 adults commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper Editors.

By a 2-1 margin, people want FBI agents and other investigators to obtain search warrants before monitoring private communications, even if they suspect terrorism. And more than a quarter of the people in the survey said they suspect their own phone calls and letters have been intercepted.

Warrants? What sort of commie demands warrants before searches can be conducted?

Oops, sorry. I was channeling "security at all costs" proponents for a second there.

The expressed worry that their own communications have been intercepted is almost certainly overblown, unless you're talking about one of the big datamining operations that essentially sucks in everything but analyzes very little of it in detail. There simply aren't enough people in the NSA, the CIA and the FBI put together to monitor the calls of a quarter of the population.

But it does show that people are thinking about how such things might affect them, moving past the simplistic "why are you so concerned about the rights of terrorists" demonizing. I'm not concerned about the rights of terrorists; I'm concerned about the rights of all citizens and detainees, including suspected terrorists.

Fully 70 percent think the federal government is secretive. They were split (46 percent to 45 percent) on whether the press should have reported on the NSA eavesdropping program; fewer people approved of revelations regarding CIA torture (43%), CIA secret prisons (41%) and (oddly) disclosure of the identities of the inmates held at Guantanamo (38%). Approval of disclosure rose with educational attainment.

Americans, as a whole, apparently like their freedoms, and aren't scared enough to give them up just yet.

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Libby roundup

The Wall Street Journal, New York Post and National Review are calling for Bush to pardon Libby. The chorus is getting loud enough that the WaPo's Al Kamen is holding a "guess the pardon date" contest.

Meanwhile, Harry Reid is demanding that President Bush pledge not to pardon the Scootster, and there's even an online exchange trading Libby pardon futures.

The article also discusses the history and propriety of presidential pardons, much of which we've already covered here.

Meanwhile, attention is already turning to Dick Cheney. The consensus: his influence in the White House will probably remain undiminished.

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Tuesday, March 06, 2007

Some general thoughts on Libby

Some perspective in its own post, to separate it from the liveblogged initial post.

PARDON POSSIBILITIES
If Bush pardons Libby, it will be near the end of his administration to minimize the political fallout.

A commenter in the other thread suggested that Libby will become Bush's Marc Rich. Rich, you may recall, was the fugitive financier pardoned by Clinton in his final days.

It's not quite a spot-on comparison, because Libby is no Marc Rich. I'm more sympathetic to pardoning an otherwise straight arrow for an essentially political crime, than I am pardoning a fugitive felon simply because he was a campaign donor.

A more apt comparison is when Bush the Elder pardoned the Iran-Contra participants. And even then, Plamegate is no Iran-Contra.

In a general sense, though, there should be a law against issuing pardons to people connected to the president or his party. Pardons are supposed to be acts of mercy, not political favors for the well-connected.

THE JURY
Was the jury filled with rabid partisan Bush-haters, and the conviction a political hammer? Another commenter claimed that. And perhaps with some justification: the trial took place in Washington D.C., which is about 90 percent Democratic. So one would expect the jury to be mostly Democrats.

But that ignores several factors. The major one is the requirement for unanimity in a verdict, meaning that if there were just one Republican on the jury -- and odds are there was at least one -- they could foil a conviction.

Secondly, Libby's lawyers were involved in jury selection, and they were certainly aware of the political implications and chose accordingly.

So let's take a look at the jury. Here's an overview story, and here's a juror-by-juror profile.

Most D.C. residents are black, but 10 of the 12 jurors were white. Nine were women. This already tells you that the jury was not representative of the area. Most said they were largely apolitical -- which would make them similar to most Americans -- but of course they could have been lying about that.

Then lets go juror by juror:

Juror #1: 30s, female, Comptroller. Studied law in grad school and has a classified government clearance pending.

Juror #2: 30s, CPA. Hs two friends in the FBI.

Juror #3: 40s, Accounting administrator for a senior-services group.

Juror #4: 30s, Hotel convention booker.

Juror #5: Denis Collins. Notes that he has a friend who played over-40 football with Libby.

Juror #6: 50s, Web architect for federal contractor.

Juror #7: 50s, retired math teacher.

Juror #8: 40s, Economist. Israeli-born, PhD from MIT, works with overseas regulators in the telecom industry.

Juror #9: 50s, worked as a secretary for Reagan and Bush the Elder administrations. Two master's degrees, friends in the Park Police, Secret Service and CIA.

Juror #10: 60s, Lawyer for the FTC.

Juror #11: 70s, retired art curator. This was the juror who was dismissed.

Juror #12: 50s, retired postal worker.

Suspected political affiliations aside, that may be the most well-educated jury I've ever seen. And while one could apply some gross stereotypes and guess at political leanings for some of them (art curator and postal worker? Democrats!!), there are several that confound expectations -- like the FTC lawyer, and the woman who worked for Republican administrations.

So I think playing "blame the jury" -- either for being partisan or being stupid -- isn't going to work very well.

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Libby found guilty

Wow.

Lewis Libby has been found guilty on 4 of the 5 counts against him.

He was found guilty of obstruction of justice, perjury and making false statements, while being found not guilty on one count of making false statements.

It will be appealed, of course, but if the verdict stands, he's going to prison.

Count #1, obstruction of justice: guilty, up to 10 years in prison

Count #2, false statements about conservations with Tim Russert: guilty.

Count #3, false statements about conversations with Time: not guilty.

Count #4, perjury related to Count #2: guilty

Count #5, perjury related to (but not limited to) Count #3: guilty

It's a little weird that he was convicted on #5 while being found not guilty on #3, but it wasn't limited to the statements involved in #3.

Total potential jail time: 30 years.

It'll be less than that, most likely. And now the question is: does he have any information that he could trade for a reduced sentence?

I'll post links and updates as soon as they appear. I'm getting most of this info from CNN.

Sentencing set for June 5, though Libby's attorneys indicate they might ask for an extension.

Anyone think Bush will pardon Libby if the conviction is upheld?

Updates: Jurist has a roundup. And here's the Associated Press story.

Update 2: The jurors are talking on CNN right now, and they said they found Russert a very credible witness, and were especially unconvinced that Libby could be "surprised" by the mention of Plame's name in his Russert conversation, when he was told more than nine times prior to that about Plame. Even if he forgot who had told him Plame's name, it struck them as very unlikely that he would have been "surprised" by later mentions.

They also found his "poor memory" defense unpersuasive when there were other people testifying that he was a detail guy and the like.

They said there was a lot of sympathy for Libby on the jury, because they viewed him as a fall guy, and wondered why no other administration officials were being questioned or on trial.

They declined to offer opinions on broader arguments, saying they were focused on the question before them.

They took so long to deliberate because they had to break down the huge amount of evidence and then stack it up against the charges. Simply organizing the information was a big task.

They acquitted him on #3 because it wasn't clear if he was lying or if it was simply a misunderstanding.

Trial was not about whether a leak occurred.

Juror speaking is very impressive, as far as his coolness and level-headedness. Turns out he's Dennis Collins, a former WaPo reporter. That helps explain his ease before a crowd.

Update #3: Time has a piece on Why Libby's Defense Failed, and notes that keeping Cheney and Libby off the stand might have been decisive:

Libby and then Cheney were expected to testify about just how crazy things were, but without notice, Wells informed the court that they would not take the stand. Instead, he offered John Hannah, Libby's former deputy, who described how terrible his boss's memory was. Then, after only three days, the defense rested its case.

Declining to put Libby or Cheney on the stand was a controversial move — and one that the defense would pay for. Often in criminal cases, and especially in those involving perjury, jurors like to hear the defendant explain his actions personally. But Libby would no doubt have been cross-examined harshly, and Cheney might have been embarrassed to explain publicly his role in undermining Wilson's criticisms of the war.

Was it a strategic mistake? Or would putting them on the stand have caused other problems? It's fun to speculate. All we know is that the defense decided that putting them on the stand wasn't in their best interest.

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Thursday, February 22, 2007

Iran roundup

As expected, an IAEA report has declared that Iran is in violation of U.N. resolutions regarding its nuclear program, opening the way for more severe sanctions.

Despite uncertainty over Iran's actual capabilities, the report nonetheless said that Iran has or soon will have 1,000 centrifuges for purifying uranium -- short of the 3,000 it expected to have by now (enough to produce one bomb's worth of uranium a year), but more than most outside observers expected.

Update: Here's the report (pdf).

Most everybody, including U.S. officials, say military action isn't imminent. Israel's being a bit mum, but Tony Blair said yesterday that an attack would be a bad idea, finally saying publicly what British officials had been saying privately for some time.

Then there's this:

Senior British government sources have told The Times that they fear President Bush will seek to “settle the Iranian question through military means” next year, before the end of his second term if he concludes that diplomacy has failed. “He will not want to leave it unresolved for his successor,” said one.

That's speculation, of course. If true, I'm of two minds on it. It's good not to let the diplomatic dance drag on indefinitely without results. But the end of his term is a fairly arbitrary deadline, and military action might simply hand his successor an ongoing crisis instead of an unresolved dispute. If we have to bomb -- and I'm on record supporting such a move if it proves necessary -- it should be because the talks went nowhere, not because Bush is preparing to leave office.

Meanwhile, the Guardian reports that our intelligence stinks...

Most of the tip-offs about supposed secret weapons sites provided by the CIA and other US intelligence agencies have led to dead ends when investigated by IAEA inspectors, according to informed sources in Vienna.

"Most of it has turned out to be incorrect," a diplomat at the IAEA with detailed knowledge of the agency's investigations said.

"They gave us a paper with a list of sites. [The inspectors] did some follow-up, they went to some military sites, but there was no sign of [banned nuclear] activities.

"Now [the inspectors] don't go in blindly. Only if it passes a credibility test."

...but Iran has some questions to answer.

One of the "outstanding issues" listed in yesterday's report involves a 15-page document that appears to have been handed to IAEA inspectors by mistake with a batch of unrelated paperwork in October 2005.

That document roughly describes how to make hemispheres of enriched uranium, for which the only known use is in nuclear warheads. Iran has yet to present a satisfactory explanation of how and why it has the document.

Whatever you think ought to be done about Iran's nuclear program, it seems beyond doubt that they are pursuing weaponry.

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Tuesday, February 13, 2007

More Iranian weaponry in Iraq?

Could be. But the evidence is far from conclusive.

Austrian sniper rifles that were exported to Iran have been discovered in the hands of Iraqi terrorists, The Daily Telegraph has learned.

More than 100 of the.50 calibre weapons, capable of penetrating body armour, have been discovered by American troops during raids.

The guns were part of a shipment of 800 rifles that the Austrian company, Steyr-Mannlicher, exported legally to Iran last year.

Here's the rifle in question, by the way.

Seems pretty clear, huh? Except that the story is extremely light on details. There is no comparison of serial numbers, for instance, to show that the rifles being captured are the same ones that were sent to Iran.

And as with yesterday's "Iranians supplying insurgents" story, there's an inexcusable fuzziness about who is being armed. We're mostly fighting Sunnis, not Shiites. So while I can see this weapon turning up in the armories of Shiite militias, I have a hard time believing it is being distributed to actual insurgents.

Further, the guns cost several thousand dollars apiece (Iran paid about $20,000 apiece) so they're not exactly flooding the market. It seems unlikely that Iran would provide such expensive and easily-traced weaponry to Iraqis.

Frankly, I have a hard time taking the London press as authoritative sources on anything. In my experience they're highly prone to reporting rumors or slanting stories -- whether out of ideology or sheer sloppiness I don't know. But if this story has legs, it will be a very strong indicator of Iranian government involvement.

I will be vastly unsurprised if it turns out Iran is arming various factions in Iraq. But I want solid evidence before we escalate against them.

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Monday, February 12, 2007

Office of Special Plans, revisited

Since making my original post on the intelligence work of Douglas Feith and the Office of Special Plans, the Washington Post has come out with a fairly spectacular correction to the original article. Here it is in full:

A Feb. 9 front-page article about the Pentagon inspector general's report regarding the office of former undersecretary of defense Douglas J. Feith incorrectly attributed quotations to that report. References to Feith's office producing "reporting of dubious quality or reliability" and that the office "was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda" were from a report issued by Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) in Oct. 2004. Similarly, the quotes stating that Feith's office drew on "both reliable and unreliable reporting" to produce a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq "that was much stronger than that assessed by the IC [Intelligence Community] and more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the Administration" were also from Levin's report. The article also stated that the intelligence provided by Feith's office supported the political views of senior administration officials, a conclusion that the inspector general's report did not draw.The two reports employ similar language to characterize the activities of Feith's office: Levin's report refers to an "alternative intelligence assessment process" developed in that office, while the inspector general's report states that the office "developed, produced, and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al Qaida relationship, which included some conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community, to senior decision-makers." The inspector general's report further states that Feith's briefing to the White House in 2002 "undercuts the Intelligence Community" and "did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by the available intelligence."

Ouch; they got their reports mixed up. Somebody ought to be missing part of their posterior over at the Post.

But does that change the underlying point of the article or my post? IMO, no.

For example, the Levin report used the language "Reporting of dubious quality or reliability," and said Feith drew on "both reliable and unreliable reporting" to reach a conclusion "that was much stronger than that assessed by the IC [Intelligence Community] and more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the Administration".

The IG report notes that Feith's reports drew on sources that were described by the Director of Central Intelligence as "of varying reliability," a fact that (while arguably obvious) Feith left out of his briefings. As for the conclusion Feith reached, the IG report described it as "not fully supported by underlying intelligence." The IG report specifically said that the available data "does not support (Feith's) position of a 'mature symbiotic relationship (between Iraq and al-Qaeda) in all areas.' "

The IG report does not comment on whether such a position was in line with senior administration officials' views, but we know from other sources that it was.

So while an embarassing gaffe for the WaPo (and one that costs us some of the more compelling quotes in the original article), the conclusions remain valid.

One can say that any misrepresentation of intelligence was Feith's fault, not the administration's. But Feith's office was deliberately set up to provide an alternative interpretation of intelligence because the White House didn't like or trust what the actual intelligence folks were telling it. And when Feith's reports began to diverge from what the intelligence agencies were telling it, what did the White House do? Embrace Feith's version. If they were misled, it was because they wanted to be misled.

Is this proof that Bush et al lied us into Iraq? Nope. But it is evidence that the administration, in the person of Feith, was working hard to make the intelligence tell it what it wanted to hear. It remains to be seen to what extent Bush or Cheney were involved in the spin. Did they actively participate in it, or did they simply set up a biased process and let it deceive them? As with so many things involving the Bush administration, it once again boils down to two basic choices: corrupt or incompetent.

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Thursday, February 08, 2007

Pentagon: Feith office massaged intelligence

Did the administration's hand-picked intelligence massager cherry pick and spin the facts in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq?

Yep.

Intelligence provided by former undersecretary of defense Douglas J. Feith to buttress the White House case for invading Iraq included "reporting of dubious quality or reliability" that supported the political views of senior administration officials rather than the conclusions of the intelligence community, according to a report by the Pentagon's inspector general.

Feith's office "was predisposed to finding a significant relationship between Iraq and al Qaeda," according to portions of the report, released yesterday by Sen. Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.). The inspector general described Feith's activities as "an alternative intelligence assessment process."

An unclassified summary of the full document is scheduled for release today in a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, which Levin chairs. In that summary, a copy of which was obtained from another source by The Washington Post, the inspector general concluded that Feith's assessment in 2002 that Iraq and al-Qaeda had a "mature symbiotic relationship" was not fully supported by available intelligence but was nonetheless used by policymakers.


This is the office -- the Office of Special Plans -- that turned into Cheney's favorite intelligence factory, and whose assessments were -- for obvious reasons -- preferred to the CIA's own.

Feith and his defenders are focusing on the finding that his activities were found to be legal. An irrelevancy, since the question has always been whether the administration cherry-picked intelligence, not whether such cherry-picking was legal. It's like Bush leaking classified material -- it's by definition legal, since he has the power to declassify anything he wants. That has nothing to do with whether it is right or proper.

More excerpts:

The summary document confirmed a range of accusations that Levin had leveled against Feith's office, alleging inaccurate work.

Feith's office, it said, drew on "both reliable and unreliable" intelligence reports in 2002 to produce a link between al-Qaeda and Iraq "that was much stronger than that assessed by the IC [Intelligence Community] and more in accord with the policy views of senior officials in the Administration."

It stated that the office produced intelligence assessments "inconsistent" with the U.S. intelligence community consensus, calling those actions "inappropriate" because the assessments purported to be "intelligence products" but were far more conclusive than the consensus view.

Notably, Feith's office produced the isolated and discredited intelligence behind the administration's claim that Mohammad Atta met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague in 2001. That's not only an example of Feith's failings; it's proof that the administration relied on Feith's reports to make their public case -- describing them as "classified intelligence" -- even though the inspector general's report contains denials that they viewed Feith's work as intelligence assessments.

Busted. I'll post a link to the actual report once the committee makes it available.

You gotta love it when the opposition takes over Congress. Suddenly we're getting hearings into things we should have had hearings on years ago, and answers are starting to pop out. This goes a long way toward filling the gap left by the Republican Congressional leadership, which never got around to conducting Part II of its analysis of intelligence failures -- the part that was supposed to investigate whether the White House misused intelligence to justify the war.

The initial answer appears to be "yes."

Update: Here's the report's executive summary (pdf). And here's an unclassified presentation on the actual report.

Update II: The Washington Post has issued a fairly big correction on its original report. I discuss it here.

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Monday, July 10, 2006

Congress kept in dark on intel programs

Rep. Pete Hoekstra wrote an angry letter (pdf) to President Bush, complaining that he had just found out about various intelligence programs that the administration hadn't bothered briefing Congress about.

"There was at least one major -- what I consider significant -- activity that we had not been briefed on that we have now been briefed on," Hoekstra said on "Fox News Sunday." "Some people within the intelligence community brought to my attention some programs that they believed we had not been briefed on. They were right."

Hoekstra said the briefings took place after he complained in a May 18 letter to President Bush of hearing about "alleged Intelligence Community activities" not described to committee members in classified briefings. "If these allegations are true," he wrote to Bush, "they may represent a breach of responsibility by the Administration, a violation of law and . . . a direct affront to me and the Members of this committee."

Two things are interesting about this:

1. He's clearly referring to programs other than the ones we already know about. It shouldn't surprise anyone that such programs exist, but it's worth keeping in mind.

2. The administration appears to ignore its duty to inform Congress about intelligence activities on a fairly regular basis. That may be a generalized executive branch habit, not just one peculiar to this administration. But that doesn't make it acceptable.

Congress should not have to find out about briefable activities and then demand briefings; that undermines the whole idea of Congressional oversight. And it's not like this is resolved. Even after receiving the briefings he sought, Hoekstra said he still thinks the administration is not fulfilling its legal obligations to inform Congress.

I agree. But I'm forced to take this with a grain of salt, seeing as how Hoekstra has been acting a bit idiotic of late.

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Friday, June 23, 2006

From telephone calls to bank records

The big revelation in today's papers are that the government has been monitoring a huge international database of financial transactions, looking for evidence of terrorist funding so they can trace it and shut it down.

The program is limited, government officials say, to tracing transactions of people suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda by reviewing records from the nerve center of the global banking industry, a Belgian cooperative that routes about $6 trillion daily between banks, brokerages, stock exchanges and other institutions. The records mostly involve wire transfers and other methods of moving money overseas and into and out of the United States. Most routine financial transactions confined to this country are not in the database.

Nobody should be suprised by this. We know the administration was monitoring phone calls, and we know they were trying to trace terrorist funding.

The one thing I find surprising is that a company based in Belgium agreed to share the data, despite rules to the contrary. But they have U.S. operations, which makes them subject to U.S. law. And in the aftermath of 9/11 they were interested in helping if they could.

So is this program another warrantless wiretap program? Yet another power grab by the administration in the name of fighting terror?

Yes and no. As constructed, I have fewer problems with this effort than I do with the eavesdropping program.

First, it's not warrantless:

Treasury officials did not seek individual court-approved warrants or subpoenas to examine specific transactions, instead relying on broad administrative subpoenas for millions of records from the cooperative, known as Swift.


Yes, it's a broad grab. But at least they're getting subpoenas (though it appears that's only because Swift demanded them). They're just National Security Letters, true, which require very little in the way of factual support. But it's better than just ignoring the whole warrant/subpoena process.

Second, it's mostly international records, and there are safeguards to keep the records of American citizens private.

Among the safeguards, government officials said, is an outside auditing firm that verifies that the data searches are based on intelligence leads about suspected terrorists. "We are not on a fishing expedition," Mr. Levey said. "We're not just turning on a vacuum cleaner and sucking in all the information that we can."

The auditing firm is a nice touch. But regardless, I have no problem with scanning foreign transactions. It's similar to what the NSA was created to do: monitor foreign communications. They don't need a warrant to do so, because foreigners have no protections under the Constitution.

So I don't have a big problem with the broad outline of the program. My concerns are smaller.

1. This program, created as a temporary, emergency measure right after 9/11, is becoming entrenched as a permanent tool. If this is going to be a long-term effort, then the program needs to ensure that it takes careful care of individual rights. As one official noted: while tight controls are in place, "the potential for abuse is enormous." It's the same problem we run into with other "emergency" powers claimed under the "war" metaphor; they are inherently incompatible with a decades-long fight such as we're facing with regard to terrorism. We need to find ways to access this data without invoking "emergency" powers that trample on rights.

2. If they're using an audit firm to ensure that every search is based on intelligence leads, that raises a big question: why do they need to use broad administrative subpoenas? If they know enough to request a record, they should be able to get a narrower warrant that would be far more protective of individual rights. The administration has shown little interest in such balancing measures. But as in the phone database case, it's not clear why -- other than a general desire to operate with as few restrictions as possible.

So while this program bears watching, and probably could use some reforms to make it compatible with long-term use, I don't find it as offensive as the more purely domestic operations that Bush has authorized.

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Thursday, June 15, 2006

The Zarqawi windfall

Putting aside the usual caveats that "body count" is not a good way to measure success, the death of Zarqawi has given U.S. and Iraqi troops at least a temporary edge against insurgents.

American and Iraqi forces have carried out 452 raids since the June 7 airstrike on al-Zarqawi, and 104 insurgents were killed in those actions, said U.S. military spokesman Maj. Gen. William Caldwell.

The nationwide raids led to the discovery of 28 significant arms caches, Caldwell said.

He said 255 of the raids were joint operations, while 143 were carried out by Iraqi forces alone. The raids also resulted in the captures of 759 "anti-Iraqi elements."

A lot of the raids were apparently based on documents found in the ruins of Zarqawi's safe house, as well as information gathered but not acted on during the hunt for Zarqawi.

That's good news, tactically speaking. At the very least Zarqawi's group will be off-balance for a while as they try to reorganize. Whether it translates into a strategic advantage depends on how deep a blow these raids represent.

The more explosive news might be the discovery of a document that appears to show the insurgency is weakening.

The document said the insurgency was being hurt by, among other things, the U.S. military's program to train Iraqi security forces, by massive arrests and seizures of weapons, by tightening the militants' financial outlets, and by creating divisions within its ranks....

According to the summary, insurgents were being weakened by operations against them and by their failure to attract recruits. To give new impetus to the insurgency, they would have to change tactics, it added.

There's no independent verification of the document's veracity. Criticism has focused on two things: how closely the document mirrors U.S./Iraqi talking points, and the absence of typical resistance language.

The language contained in the document was different from the vocabulary used by al-Qaida statements posted on the Web. For example, it does not refer to the Americans as "Crusaders" nor use the term "rejectionists" to allude to Shiites.

Much of what is in the statement from al-Rubaie echoes results that the U.S. military and the Iraqi government say they are seeking. It also appears to reinforce American and Iraqi arguments that al-Qaida in Iraq and its operatives are a group of imported extremists bent on killing innocent civilians.

The fact that it was the Iraqi government, not the American military, that released the document also raises a flag. I don't think the Pentagon would outright fabricate a document like this; I'm not so sure the Iraqi government has such qualms.

So for now I wait for further analysis and verification. The full text of the document is here.

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Monday, June 12, 2006

NSA spying goes to court

Today a judge will hear arguments in an ACLU lawsuit against the NSA's warrantless eavesdropping program.

The suit in Detroit, like one filed in New York by the Center for Constitutional Rights, asserts that the NSA's eavesdropping program has violated free-speech and privacy rights and has had a chilling effect on the communications of potential surveillance targets.

The major problem with this suit will be the Catch-22 of "standing". Before a plaintiff can sue, they usually have to show that they were affected by the behavior in question, or that they're otherwise qualified to speak for affected parties.

The problem is that the NSA (for obvious reasons) has refused to say who it is monitoring. So a judge may dismiss the suit because the ACLU cannot show it is affected.

The ACLU is trying to get around that by saying the mere existence of the program affects it:

None of the plaintiffs have offered proof they were spied on. Rather, they maintain that the simple existence of the program has impeded their ability to perform their jobs as journalists and lawyers.

"The program is causing concrete and specific injury to plaintiffs and others," the ACLU said in a motion in March, asking U.S. District Judge Anna Diggs Taylor to declare the program illegal and to order its immediate halt.

A brief by Ann Beeson and other ACLU attorneys said the program was disrupting plaintiffs' ability "to talk with sources, locate witnesses, conduct scholarship, engage in advocacy and engage in other activity protected by the 1st Amendment."

The ACLU attorneys contend that because President Bush and several Cabinet members, including Atty. Gen. Alberto R. Gonzales, have publicly acknowledged the existence of the program, Taylor has sufficient evidence to rule on the legality of the program without further fact-finding.

It's worth a try. It seems to me, though, that in important cases like this there should be available a broader form of standing, one that allows a court opinion to be rendered without requiring proof that the plaintiff has been specifically targeted. It would be a class-action suit of sorts, following the logic that "we're all affected by this program, either directly or indirectly, so we all have standing to question it."

Meanwhile, Arlen Specter is keeping the issue alive in Congress, threatening to subpoena phone company executives if the administration doesn't start cooperating.

"If we don't get some results, I'm prepared to go back to demand hearings and issue subpoenas if necessary," Pennsylvania Sen. Arlen Specter told CNN's "Late Edition."

Tough words, and it goes nicely with his assertion that there is "no doubt" the program violates FISA -- which should be blindingly obvious. I approve of his proposed solution: that Bush let the FISA court decide if the program is constitutional. That addresses both security and constitutionality concerns.

But since Bush has not traditionally liked restrictions on his ability to do as he pleases, and since he has asserted the "inherent authority" to conduct such surveillance, I don't expect him to suddenly submit to the judiciary's authority.

If that happens, I expect Specter and others in Congress to hold the administration accountable. The country is not served by Congress rolling over, or shrugging and saying "well, we tried." One way or another, the legality of the NSA program needs to be settled. And if the administration is unwilling to cooperate in that endeavor, then it is time for Congress and the courts to exercise their constitutional obligations and begin acting like the "checks and balances" they were designed to be.

Update: The Washington Post covers the hearing.

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